The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Duration on Job Quality: Evidence from Post-Hartz Germany by Davey, Paul C.
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104377
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2015
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
The Eﬀects of Unemployment Insurance
Duration on Job Quality: Evidence from
Post-Hartz Germany
Author: Paul C. Davey
The Effects of  Unemployment Insurance Duration on Job 
Quality: Evidence from Post-Hartz Germany 
Paul C. Davey 
Professor Andrew Beauchamp, Advisor 
Boston College Department of  Economics 
May 2015  
Abstract 
	 This paper examines the effect of  changes in the duration of  unemployment insurance on 
various measures of  post-unemployment job quality within the context of  Germany after the 
Hartz reforms. I find a significant positive effect of  UI duration on re-employment wage, as well 
as significant effects for certain demographic groups indicating increased occupational prestige, 
job satisfaction, and satisfaction with hours of  work. I find no significant effect on distance from 
home to work. 
	 I find that the positive relationship between UI eligibility and unemployment duration is 
based solely on the unemployment durations of  those who exit the labor force after 
unemployment; I find no evidence of  a link between UI eligibility and unemployment duration 
for those who found jobs at the end of  their unemployment spells. 
	 To understand these results, I propose several possible explanations: heterogenous job 
search behaviors among those with different UI durations, a psychological burden of  impending 
UI exhaustion, a negotiation advantage of  a higher reservation wage for those with longer 
eligibility, or the possibility that my data simply failed to observe a positive relationship between 
UI duration and unemployment duration. Finally, I present one possible policy response to these 
findings, aimed at reducing the problem of  free riding.  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1   Introduction 
	 On January 1, 2005, the fourth and final step in a series of  unemployment policy reforms 
went into effect across the Federal Republic of  Germany. This legislation, the Viertes Gesetz für 
moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt , was based on a set of  recommendations from a 1
commission led by Volkswagen executive Peter Hartz, who is immortalized in the popular title for 
this law: Hartz IV. 
	 The first three reforms advocated by this commission, Hartz I-III, were fairly 
uncontroversial. These laws reformed active labor market policies (ALMP), restructured German 
employment law, and reorganized federal employment services. Hartz IV, on the other hand, 
constituted a major overhaul of  Germany’s long-term unemployment insurance (UI) system, 
which had previously been one of  the world’s most generous. The legislation brought about two 
major changes: it reduced the time that an unemployed person could receive short-term 
unemployment insurance, and it changed (and generally decreased) the amount of  
unemployment assistance offered to the long-term unemployed. 
	 This law was the most wide-ranging reform in the history of  the German welfare system, 
and it remains a hot-button issue, even a decade after it came into effect. Germany’s two current 
parliamentary opposition parties, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  and Die Linke , advocate for the reform 2 3
and abolition of  Hartz IV, respectively. On the other side of  the political spectrum, Hartz-IV-
Empfänger  has become shorthand to identify and condemn those who rely on long-term 4
unemployment assistance: a German equivalent of  Americans’ attitudes towards “trailer trash,” 
 “Fourth Law for Modern Services on the Labor Market”1
 “Alliance ’90/The Greens”2
 “The Left”3
 “Hartz IV recipient”4
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perhaps. The arguments for and against Hartz IV are well-worn: the left claims that Hartz IV 
condemns the unemployed to legalized poverty without improving their chances to find a job, 
while the right maintains that reducing benefits incentivizes employment for those who would 
otherwise gladly live at taxpayers’ expense. 
	 Economists, too, disagree on the overall effect of  Hartz IV. Some claim that it led to 
increased job search efficiency, producing a significant drop in unemployment without 
appreciable negative side effects. Others say that it had a minimal effect on unemployment, and 
was welfare-reducing for society as a whole. This paper offers a new angle on the understanding 
of  unemployment in Germany after Hartz IV. Using individual survey data from the German 
Sozio-oekonomisches Panel  (SOEP), I examine how the maximum potential duration of  5
unemployment insurance affects the characteristics of  jobs found after an unemployment spell. 
These characteristics are chosen to be indicative of  the desirability of  a position: wage, prestige, 
job satisfaction, hours per week , and distance from home to work. In brief, the question I seek to 6
answer is this: to what extent does a reduction in the duration of  unemployment insurance 
induce job seekers to accept positions that have less desirable characteristics? To answer this 
question, I run several regressions with UI duration as an explanatory variable, isolating the effect 
of  UI eligibility on each of  these outcomes. I also run these regressions for different segments of  
the population to see how the effects of  additional UI duration might vary for different groups of  
people. 
	 I find a significant effect of  UI duration on wage: an additional month of  UI eligibility 
corresponds to a 3% to 4% increase in re-employment wage. This effect is heterogenous across 
different groups: it is particularly pronounced among female, unmarried, and older workers. For 
 “Socio-Economic Panel”5
 I have generated a measure of  satisfaction with work hours; this will be explained in §3.2.3.6
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prestige, job satisfaction, and hours per week, my results for the sample as a whole fall short of  
statistical significance, but significant results exist for some demographic groups. For distance to 
work, I find no significant relationship. 
	 I also examine the relationship between UI duration and unemployment spell duration 
and find evidence that extended UI eligibility is linked to longer unemployment spells. However, 
when dividing the sample into those whose unemployment spell ends in finding a job and those 
who exit the labor force, I find that this effect is driven exclusively by the latter. For those whose 
unemployment spells end in employment, longer UI eligibility seems to have no direct effect on 
the duration of  unemployment, whereas those who exit the labor force are likely to respond to 
extended UI by lengthening their unemployment spells. 
	 Economists have argued that extended UI increases reservation wage and decreases the 
marginal benefit of  search, increasing unemployment spell duration. This result, then, raises 
questions: if  those with extended UI eligibility are not choosing longer unemployment spells, why 
might they find jobs with more desirable characteristics? I propose a few theories that might to 
explain this effect. First, those who have shorter UI eligibility, wary of  benefit expiration, may 
undertake a wide, but not concentrated, job search, looking for any position to avoid the 
problems of  exhausting UI. Those who have access to longer-term UI, on the other hand, may 
focus their efforts on searching for high-paying full-time jobs. Another possibility is that the threat 
of  UI expiration, which is more potent for those with shorter benefit durations, is a psychological 
stressor that negatively impacts their job search performance, leading to longer unemployment 
durations and worse jobs. A third theory is that workers with longer UI eligibility, who should 
have higher reservation wages, will be more assertive in negotiations with prospective employers, 
gaining benefits like higher wages without extending their job searches. A final possibility is that 
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there is a small effect on spell duration that is simply unobserved here because of  the nature of  
the data used. Any of  these theories, or some combination of  the four, might help to explain why 
those with longer UI eligibility find better jobs without experiencing longer unemployment 
durations. 
	 I conclude by connecting my results to the debate over the effects of  Hartz IV. The results 
suggest that decreasing UI duration has effects beyond the unemployment rate; those who are 
subjected to shorter periods of  UI eligibility are likely to find less desirable jobs. Thus, this 
provision of  Hartz IV may have been welfare-reducing in ways that other studies, which focus on 
job-finding alone, may not observe. My results with respect to spell duration, too, have 
implications for policy. Those who exit the labor force after an unemployment spell, unlike those 
who find employment, benefit from longer UI duration by choosing longer unemployment spells. 
As a study of  extended UI duration in the United States argued, “there may be individuals who 
remain attached to the labor force, perhaps searching at a low level, because extended benefits 
are available… [this effect] reflects mainly a redistribution to long-term job losers who, without 
extended benefits, would have left the labor force” (Farber & Valletta, 2013). In light of  this, I 
propose a potential redesign of  UI distribution in Germany, reducing free riding by linking UI 
payments to future employment. 
1.1   Historical Background 
	 Until 2005, unemployment insurance in Germany was administered through a three-
tiered benefits system. Those who lost their jobs were eligible for Arbeitslosengeld  (ALG), which was 7
set at 60% of  previous earnings (67% for those with children). An unemployed person could 
 “unemployment benefits”7
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claim ALG for 6 to 32 months, depending on age and duration of  previous employment. Once 
ALG eligibility expired, the next step was Arbeitslosenhilfe  (ALH). ALH was set at 53% of  previous 8
income (57% for those with children), and an unemployed person could receive ALH indefinitely, 
subject to a yearly means-tested renewal. If  a person was ineligible for ALH, either through being 
unwilling or unable to work, he or she would be eligible for Sozialhilfe , which was set at a baseline 9
entitlement (Regelsatz) equal to €295 per month immediately before Hartz IV, with supplements 
for those with dependent children. Jacobi & Kluve (2007) attribute this structure to the German 
understanding of  the purpose of  unemployment insurance at the time: “From the very 
beginning, unemployment benefits were meant to maintain the worker’s social status during 
unemployment rather than providing a safety net as a last resort.” This mindset helps to explain 
why a generous benefits system arose; however, such a system provided obvious work 
disincentives. The long period of  ALG receipt allowed for a less urgent job search; for those over 
the age of  57, who could receive ALG for up to 32 months, unemployment was sometimes used 
as an early retirement strategy (Caliendo, Tatsiramos, & Uhlendorff, 2009). With generous ALH 
benefits available indefinitely, many felt little pressure to return to work, especially if  they would 
have to take a lower-paying job due to skill deterioration. These work disincentives for the 
unemployed contributed to West Germany’s persistently high unemployment rate through the 
1980s, but the system remained in place. 
	 Reunification in 1990 sent a shockwave through the German labor market. The entire 
East German labor force entered the labor market, and these workers were generally less well-
trained than their West German counterparts. Despite the skill disparity, the unified German 
government faced pressure to close the wage gap between East and West Germans, thwarting the 
 “unemployment assistance”8
 “social assistance”9
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competitive advantage of  lower wages that produced growth in other Eastern Bloc countries 
(Jacobi & Kluve, 2007). This drove up unemployment further, creating an untenable financial 
situation for the German unemployment insurance system as a whole. This, combined with clear 
systematic inefficiencies, generated the political will to attempt sweeping reforms, and in 2002, 
the federal government appointed Peter Hartz to lead the Kommission für moderne Dienstleistungen am 
Arbeitsmarkt , tasked with making recommendations to improve the efficiency of  the German 10
labor market. 
	 The recommendations of  the commission were adopted and introduced as four separate 
pieces of  legislation. Hartz I, which took effect on January 1, 2003, introduced the Personal-Service-
Agentur  (PSA), a local agency to offer temporary work to the unemployed, operated either by the 11
local unemployment office or through private contracting. Hartz I also strengthened the job-
training services of  the federal employment agency and sought to increase the acceptability of  
temporary work through deregulation coupled with equal-treatment protection. Hartz II, 
introduced simultaneously, created two new legal categories of  employment, Minijobs and 
Midijobs. Minijobs are positions that pay €450 or less per month (€400 at the time of  introduction) 
and are exempt from social security contributions; a Midijob is eligible for reduced social security 
contributions up to a wage of  €800 per month. Hartz II also included a new subsidy, called Ich-
AG , for unemployed people who wish to start their own business. Hartz III took effect on 12
January 1, 2004. It focused on restructuring the federal employment agency, which was renamed 
from the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit  to the Bundesagentur für Arbeit  (BA). The goal of  the 13 14
 “Commission for Modern Services on the Labor Market”10
 “Staff  Service Agency”11
 “Me, Inc.”12
 “Federal Employment Institution”13
 “Federal Employment Agency”14
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reorganization was to turn inefficient, bureaucratic offices into customer-oriented service centers. 
Each office offered more services, paid more individual attention to job seekers, and pursued 
quantitative outcome targets. Hartz III also liberalized access to wage subsidies offered to 
employers hiring hard-to-employ workers. 
	 Hartz IV, which became active on January 1, 2005 , reorganized the structure of  15
unemployment insurance. ALG (commonly called ALG I today) was preserved at its previous 
level of  60% to 67% of  previous income. However, ALG I receipt was limited to a maximum of  
18 months (later increased to 24 months), accompanied by a restructuring of  the age-based 
eligibility thresholds, which will be detailed later in this paper. ALH and Sozialhilfe were 
eliminated and replaced with a flat-rate Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II), based on a Regelsatz of  €345 
for a single adult in West Germany, a 17% increase over the previous Regelsatz for Sozialhilfe 
recipients, and supplemented with coverage for basic housing and healthcare. ALG II can be 
received indefinitely, but depends on a recipient’s ability to work at least 15 hours per week as 
well as annual means-testing. This change affected different groups of  the long-term unemployed 
in different ways. According to an IAB  estimate, 17% of  ALH recipients were ineligible for 16
ALG II due to changes in the definition of  need that determined eligibility. Of  those that did 
receive ALG II, 47% received higher benefits under Hartz IV, as their previous income was low 
enough that their ALH payments had been lower than the flat-rate ALG II payments (Blos & 
Rudolph, 2005). On average, however, the change to ALG II produced a lower level of  long-term 
unemployment assistance. Finally, a new concept of  Sozialhilfe was developed, now separate from 
the unemployment insurance system. Today’s Sozialhilfe is expressed as minimal Grundsicherung  17
 Most of  Hartz IV went into effect on this date; however, the limitations on ALG I duration, which are 15
the background for my analysis in this paper, didn’t come into effect until February 1, 2006.
 Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, “Institute for Employment Research”16
 “basic security”17
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reserved for those who are unable to work due to old age or temporary incapacity, with a Regelsatz 
equivalent to that of  ALG II. After Hartz IV, those able but unwilling to seek work are eligible for 
neither ALG II nor Sozialhilfe, and thus receive no income from the state. 
	 The introduction of  Hartz IV saw protests across Germany. Unemployment at the time 
was over 10 percent, and millions of  Germans who had passed the point of  ALG I eligibility 
faced a reduction in benefits as their ALH benefits were reduced to the flat-rate ALG II. In East 
Germany, where unemployment was far higher than in West Germany, protestors organized 
Montagsdemonstrationen  against Hartz IV, calling to mind the 1989 Montagsdemonstrationen that 18
gathered hundreds of  thousands of  East Germans to protest against the communist regime. The 
protests failed to halt the implementation of  Hartz IV, although public discontent over Hartz IV 
and other economic policies of  Germany’s ruling party, the center-left SPD , contributed to the 19
calling of  an early election in 2005, in which Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s SPD lost its 
plurality, and thus its control of  the chancellorship, to Angela Merkel’s center-right CDU . In 20
2007, the new CDU-SPD coalition government agreed to raise the maximum receipt duration 
for ALG I from 18 to 24 months, the only major concession to pressure from anti-Hartz IV 
activists. 
	 Although Hartz IV remains a contentious issue today, it has survived for 10 years and 
shows no signs of  repeal in the immediate future. After all, at first glance, the reform appears to 
be working. Unemployment fell from over 11 percent in 2005 to under 7 percent today, and 
Germany’s unemployment rate was scarcely affected by the so-called Great Recession. Hartz IV’s 
opponents must reckon with the fact that unemployment fell swiftly and decisively after the law 
 “Monday demonstrations”18
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, “Social Democratic Party of  Germany”19
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, “Christian Democratic Union of  Germany”20
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took effect. There are still arguments to be made against Hartz IV: economic inequality has risen 
in Germany, and a lower unemployment rate is not synonymous with a better society. 
Furthermore, a fall in unemployment since 2005 doesn’t prove that Hartz IV caused the decline
—the introduction of  Hartz I-III in the preceding two years certainly makes the individual 
impact of  Hartz IV less easily identifiable. But the persistently lower level of  unemployment in 
Germany today is certainly an inconvenient political reality for those who would fight for the 
abolition of  Hartz IV. To provide a clear answer on the effect of  the Hartz reforms, it is necessary 
to isolate the impact of  the reforms from wider macroeconomic trends, which calls for a more 
rigorous approach than a quick glance at the unemployment rate over time. In this regard, 
economics can productively lend its voice to the debate, and it is in this spirit that this I seek to 
examine the effects of  ALG I duration on re-employment outcomes. 
2   Literature Review 
	 Given the controversy that arose around the Hartz reforms, a sizable literature has 
already developed to analyze their effects. A comprehensive summary of  the effects of  Hartz I-III 
comes from Jacobi & Kluve (2007). The authors first explain the background and implications of  
each part of  the reforms, sorting them into three categories according to their aims: “improving 
labour market services and policy measures in terms of  effectiveness and efficiency,” “activating 
the unemployed by enforcing the so-called principle of  ‘rights and duties,’” and “stimulating 
employment demand by deregulating the labour market.” They then summarize early results on 
the effectiveness of  Hartz I-III, evaluating how the effectiveness of  active labor market policies 
changed due to Hartz. They find that some measures had positive effects on employment: Ich-AG 
subsidies, the creation of  Minijobs and Midijobs, the deregulation of  temporary work, and wage 
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subsidies for older workers all increased employment. The creation of  PSAs seems to have been 
detrimental, with other measures having no effect or ambiguous effects. On the whole, the 
authors conclude, “the effectiveness of  [ALMP] measures has improved modestly,” and the 
measures implemented by Hartz I-III represent an improvement over previous measures for the 
unemployed in Germany. This view is confirmed by Fahr & Sunde (2009), who use a 
macroeconomic matching function to evaluate structural changes occurring at the time of  Hartz 
I-III. They find that the two waves, Hartz I/II in 2003 and Hartz III in 2004, complemented one 
another and significantly accelerated unemployment outflows compared to the pre-2003 state, 
reflecting increased efficiency in the job-matching process. 
	 One analysis of  the effects of  the Hartz reforms taken as a whole comes from Hertweck & 
Sigrist (2013). The authors estimate the effects of  Hartz by looking at the relative importance of  
inflows and outflows in determining the unemployment rate in Germany, using the same SOEP 
dataset that I will use in this paper. Evaluating data starting in 1984, they find that inflows into 
unemployment were the chief  determinant of  the unemployment rate before Hartz, consistent 
with an inefficient job-matching market. The authors argue that unemployment outflows were 
low because high unemployment benefits and high firing costs both disincentivized job-matching. 
In the early 2000s, however, the importance of  the outflow rate in determining the 
unemployment rate increased significantly, indicating a 23% increase in job-matching efficiency. 
Although this model does not prove causality with respect to the Hartz reforms, the fact that the 
market experienced a sharp change after twenty years of  stability would seem to indicate a 
structural change rather than natural variation, consistent with knowledge of  the legislation that 
came into effect at that time. 
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	 Several papers attempt to address Hartz IV specifically. Krause & Uhlig (2011) develop a 
model of  the German unemployment market that hinges on skill heterogeneity. Long-term 
unemployment was an intractable problem before Hartz: skill loss over time, coupled with 
generous long-term unemployment benefits, meant that many people had no incentive to accept 
lower-paying jobs commensurate with their new skill levels. Krause and Uhlig’s model indicates 
that Hartz IV, taken alone, reduced unemployment by 2.8 percentage points by increasing labor 
market tightness and job acceptance. Krebs & Scheffel (2013) develop a model featuring 
heterogenous search effort and a decision to invest in physical or human capital. This model finds 
a 1.4 percentage point decrease in unemployment as a result of  Hartz IV, mainly driven by 
increased search effort by the short-term and long-term unemployed. Hartz IV also increases 
investment in human capital, which contributes to higher economic growth. Societal welfare 
experiences an increase equal to .36 percent of  lifetime consumption; however, the gains are not 
distributed evenly among the population. Employed households benefit from a decrease in taxes 
needed to pay for unemployment insurance, with a welfare increase of  .44 percent of  lifetime 
consumption, while the long-term unemployed suffer a welfare decrease of  .74 percent due to the 
decrease in unemployment insurance, with the short-term unemployed falling roughly in the 
middle. The authors speculate that the sharp welfare reduction for the long-term unemployed 
may be to blame for the societal backlash against Hartz IV. 
	 Launov & Wälde (2013), on the other hand, have a less positive view of  the effects of  
Hartz IV on unemployment. They develop an equilibrium matching model to predict individual 
employment probabilities, which they then extend to predict aggregate unemployment. In their 
model, unemployment exit rates depend chiefly on two factors: monetary incentives, particularly 
those related to benefit expiration, and negative duration dependence (that is, exit probability 
"13
falls with longer unemployment duration), with the tradeoff  between these factors varying across 
sections of  the population. They find that unemployment was essentially unchanged by Hartz IV, 
falling by .07 percentage points. This effect is heterogeneous, with unemployment actually rising 
for low-skilled workers. Net wages rise, both from increased employment and from improved job-
matching as search effort increases, and taxes fall as benefits are reduced. Despite these positive 
effects, the reform is intertemporally welfare-reducing for medium- and high-skilled workers, as 
the negative effects on anticipated long-term unemployment outweigh the increase in net wages. 
Thus, for Launov & Wälde, Hartz IV failed in its main objective (reducing unemployment) and 
reduced social welfare. And what about the fall in unemployment? Rather than crediting Hartz 
IV, the authors point to a 4% increase in total factor productivity between 2005 and 2007 as the 
reason for Germany’s employment boom. 
	 Several papers on topics other than the Hartz reforms help to form the analytical 
framework for this project. One important analysis comes from Chetty (2008), who questions the 
conventional wisdom that the employment disincentive effects of  unemployment insurance are 
universally welfare-reducing, arguing instead that the longer unemployment duration associated 
with more generous unemployment insurance consists of  both moral hazard and liquidity effects, 
which have negative and positive welfare effects, respectively. The moral hazard of  
unemployment insurance is clear: if  you give money to an unemployed person, that may lead her 
to reduce her search effort relative to if  the money had not been provided. Less well-documented 
in the economic literature, however, is the welfare-increasing liquidity effect of  unemployment 
insurance. Chetty conceives of  this as a safety net for those who are unable to smooth 
consumption perfectly due to failures in credit and insurance markets. He finds this effect 
empirically through two different analyses. First, he compares the effect of  unemployment 
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insurance on unemployment durations in liquidity-constrained and non-constrained households, 
and finds that an increase in benefits raises unemployment durations significantly for constrained 
households, whereas the effects are much smaller for non-constrained households, indicating the 
presence of  a liquidity effect separate from moral hazard. He also looks at recipients of  lump-
sum severance payments, which reduce liquidity constraints without producing moral hazard, 
and finds that these recipients are likely to have significantly longer unemployment durations. 
Combining these results, he finds that in the United States, liquidity effects dominate over moral 
hazard, indicating that an increase in unemployment insurance would be welfare-increasing. 
	 This work has important implications for my analysis. It serves as a word of  warning in 
interpreting the results of  any Hartz IV analysis: a decrease in average unemployment duration is 
not necessarily welfare-increasing for a society. According to Chetty, if  liquidity effects 
predominate, people are forced into a sub-optimally short unemployment durations because 
inefficient credit and insurance markets prevent them from smoothing consumption properly; 
people would choose longer durations if  they could smooth consumption optimally. In other 
words, by cutting benefits in an attempt to induce shorter unemployment durations, Hartz IV 
and reforms like it may be addressing a relatively minor moral hazard problem while amplifying 
the greater problem of  consumption smoothing inefficiency. Beyond this, Chetty’s analysis 
provides empirical evidence for what one might intuitively expect: unemployment imposes serious 
liquidity constraints on those who cannot smooth income perfectly, which in turn affects their job 
search. This can be seen as the underlying explanation for the effects that I will explore in this 
paper: if  people are increasingly willing to settle for sub-optimal positions when benefit duration 
is shortened, it could be a sign that liquidity constraints require them to accept a job in a shorter 
timeframe than they would otherwise choose. 
"15
	 Farber & Valletta (2013) examine the effect of  UI extensions on unemployment duration 
in the United States during two recessionary periods: 2002 to 2004 and 2009 to 2012. Their 
work has significant implications for my analysis of  ALG I eligibility on unemployment spell 
duration. They find a small but significant reduction in the exit rate from unemployment as a 
result of  UI extensions; however, when they run this analysis using a competing risk model that 
examines the outcome of  an exit from unemployment (i.e., did an unemployment spell end 
because the person found a job or because she exited the labor force?), they find that extended 
benefit duration has no substantial effect on the exit rate to employment, whereas there is a 
significant effect of  decreasing the exit rate to leaving the labor force. According to this model, 
then, additional UI eligibility does not cause moral hazard that disincentivizes serious job search, 
nor does it cause those searching for jobs to spend longer doing so; however, it does benefit those 
who might elect to receive UI without a real intention of  returning to work. 
	 Schmieder, von Wachter, & Bender (2012) carry out a regression discontinuity analysis of  
German unemployment insurance with the aim of  seeing how the effects of  UI change during 
recessions. Looking at data from the pre-Hartz unemployment system, they find that the 
employment disincentive effects of  extended unemployment insurance are smaller during 
recessions, whereas the benefit of  additional coverage increases as more people use the full 
duration of  benefit receipt, implying that Germany might do well to adopt a policy of  
countercyclical increases to unemployment benefit duration. Interestingly, they put exact figures 
on the nonemployment  effect of  benefit extension, stating that an additional month of  ALG 21
coverage increased the average nonemployment spell by .1 month, which was relatively consistent 
for all three age cutoffs. They also find a strong effect of  duration extension on coverage, with an 
 Rather than looking at unemployment and absence from the labor force separately, both of  these states 21
are grouped into nonemployment in this analysis.
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additional month of  ALG eligibility increasing average ALG receipt by .3 to .4 months, 
consistent with their finding that about a quarter of  beneficiaries remain on ALG until 
expiration. This is driven by those who will exit the labor force after their ALG eligibility expires: 
only 8 percent of  those who exhaust their benefits return to employment. 
	 A final analysis of  pre-Hartz Germany comes from Caliendo, Tatsiramos, & Uhlendorff  
(2009). Their work asks how unemployment exit rates and the quality of  jobs found change near 
the expiration of  UI coverage. Using data from 2001 to 2003, they examine a discontinuity in 
unemployment exits at age 45, where maximum ALG duration changes from 12 months to 18 
months, to test the theory that the expiration of  unemployment benefits causes a higher exit rate 
and worse matches. With respect to exit rates, they find that unemployment hazard rates spike 
just before each group’s respective expiration dates. As for job quality, they examine employment 
hazard for subsequent jobs (that is, the probability of  losing the job found after an unemployment 
spell) and find that hazard is significantly higher for the 12-month-UI-eligibility group for jobs 
found after 10-12 and 16-18 months of  unemployment. This provides two interesting 
conclusions: stability is lower for jobs found just before benefit expiration, and stability is lower 
still for jobs found after benefit expiration: between 16 and 18 months, when 12-month group is 
receiving ALH and the 18-month group is approaching ALG expiration, the 12-month group 
finds jobs that are less stable. They also examine variation in re-employment wage. They find a 
small, insignificant increase in wage for those who were eligible for a longer ALG duration. They 
also find a significant wage decrease for jobs accepted near benefit expiration, consistent with a 
falling reservation wage as expiration approaches. The authors draw two major conclusions: 
benefits create work disincentives but improve match quality, and job seekers become less 
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selective as benefit expiration nears, implying that a more gradual schedule of  benefit expiration 
might be useful in curbing the problem of  low-quality matches. 
3   Methodology 
3.1   Model 
	 In my analysis, I use ordinary least squares regressions with ALG I eligibility, 
demographic characteristics, labor market history, and other factors as explanatory variables, and 
with unemployment spell duration and subsequent employment characteristics as response 
variables. This choice is based at least partially on the limitations of  the dataset used. In their 
analysis, Caliendo, Tatsiramos, & Uhlendorff  use a large administrative dataset, allowing them to 
employ regression discontinuity analysis over a relatively narrow group of  people entering 
unemployment. I had originally hoped to carry out a regression discontinuity analysis, but 
because my survey dataset was smaller and not focused on unemployment in particular, it didn’t 
offer a large enough sample size of  people entering unemployment around certain age thresholds 
to carry out a serious regression discontinuity study. However, due to the discontinuous 
determination of  ALG I duration, OLS regressions allow me to isolate the effects of  this duration 
on the response variables. 
3.1.1   Determining ALG I Duration after Hartz IV 
	 My key variable, of  course, is ALG I duration. This variable is determined through a 
combination of  age at the time of  entry into unemployment and work history for a period 
preceding unemployment. For workers of  most ages, it is determined based on months of  
qualifying employment over the past two years, using a formula that did not change with the 
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introduction of  Hartz IV. Qualification is based on whether a particular job is versicherungspflichtig, 
meaning that it is subject to mandatory social security contributions . If  a UI applicant has been 22
employed in a qualifying job for at least 12 months in the past two years, she is eligible for 6 
months of  ALG I. This eligibility increases with the number of  months worked, with someone 
who has been employed each month for the past two years eligible for 12 months of  ALG I. 
Figure 1: Maximum ALG I Duration for Most Workers  23
"  
	 My analysis hinges on the fact that ALG I duration is not determined by a strictly linear 
relationship to qualifying months of  employment. Instead, ALG I eligibility jumps up at certain 
points and remains static at others. Although every increase in UI duration corresponds to an 
increase in months of  qualifying employment, there is also variation in qualifying employment 
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 Recall that certain forms of  employment, such as Minijobs paying up to €450 per month, are exempt 22
from these contributions.
 Maximum duration for workers up to age 54 between February 2006 and December 2007 and workers 23
up to age 49 since January 2007.
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time that has no effect on ALG I duration. This ALG I-independent variation will allow 
regressions to estimate the effects of  additional employment and additional UI eligibility 
separately. 
	 Hartz IV continued the previous system’s extended UI eligibility for older workers, but it 
changed the rules that determine eligibility. In the pre-Hartz system, extended UI was offered 
starting at age 45 and could last up to 32 months for workers 57 and older; after Hartz IV went 
into effect, this was limited to workers aged 55, whose eligibility could increase to 18 months. 
However, such a sharp decrease proved deeply unpopular, and within two years a new framework 
was put into place, starting at age 50 and reaching a maximum of  24 months for workers 58 and 
older. 
Table 1: Maximum ALG I Duration for Older Workers, Feb. 2006 to Dec. 2007 
Table 2: Maximum ALG I Duration for Older Workers Since Jan. 2008 
Months of  qualifying 
employment, past 5 years
Age Maximum ALG I 
duration (months)
30 55 15
36 55 18
Note: Restrictions listed represent minimum values.
Months of  qualifying 
employment, past 5 years
Age Maximum ALG I 
duration (months)
30 50 15
36 55 18
48 58 24
Note: Restrictions listed represent minimum values.
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	 In this case, too, there is variation in age and qualifying months of  employment within 
each fixed ALG I duration bracket. Thus, although potential ALG I duration is highly correlated 
with employment history and age, its effect can be estimated independently. In each regression in 
my analysis, age and employment history (qualifying months in two years preceding an 
unemployment spell as well as qualifying months in the preceding three to five years) are all 
included as explanatory variables, which means regression coefficients for ALG I eligibility should 
be legitimate measures of  the real effect of  additional UI duration. Fortunately, because ALG I 
eligibility is determined strictly by age and employment history, and these variables can be 
precisely controlled for, the danger of  eligibility being correlated with unobserved factors should 
be relatively small. 
3.2   Data 
	 This study employs the German SOEP dataset. This longitudinal survey has been 
conducted on a representative sample of  the population of  Germany since 1984, providing a 
wealth of  responses to demographic, economic, sociological, and psychological questions. Today, 
the sample includes over 20,000 respondents surveyed annually. Outside of  Europe, researchers 
are allowed to access a 95% random sample of  the data to comply with German privacy laws, so 
the data used in this study include that limitation. 
3.2.1   Selecting Suitable Unemployment Spells 
	 To carry out my regressions, I was interested in unemployment spells beginning after the 
ALG I duration adjustments of  Hartz IV came into effect on February 1, 2006. In particular, I 
examined uncensored unemployment spells using data from February 2006 to December 2012 
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(the most recent data available) in SOEP’s ARTKALEN dataset. This dataset converts responses 
from an employment calendar section of  the survey into data on “spells” of  various types: 
employment, unemployment, education, etc. In total, 227,783 spells of  all types are included, of  
which 5,638 are unemployment spells in my period of  interest. I eliminated any spells that are 
censored. In these spells, start and end dates cannot be clearly defined, which may be due to a 
person entering or leaving the dataset, filling out a survey improperly, or because a person was 
still unemployed at the end of  my observation period. However, the precise duration of  
unemployment spells is key to my analysis, so censored spells had to be removed. 
	 I also disregard spells during which the person in question would be ineligible for ALG I 
(those who had less than 12 months of  qualifying employment in the two years preceding their 
unemployment spells). Of  course, I am examining the effects of  ALG I in particular, so the job 
outcomes of  those who are ineligible for ALG I are less relevant to my analysis. It could be 
argued that these people should be entered as recipients of  0 months of  UI. However, under 
certain conditions, those who have between 6 and 11 months of  qualifying employment in the 
past two years may be eligible for 3 to 5 months of  UI. This program, however, is subject to more 
restrictions and contingencies than the normal ALG I formula, so I would be unable to 
determine whether or not those who might be eligible based on work history were, in reality, 
eligible. To ensure the accuracy of  my UI duration variable, I elected to focus on spells that had 
at least 12 months of  qualifying employment in the preceding two years, and were thereby 
eligible for ALG I. 
	 I also eliminated spells where patchy data in the pre-unemployment period prevented me 
from determining the exact number of  months of  qualifying employment. This challenge will be 
explained in more detail in §3.2.3. 
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	 The final step in selecting spells was to eliminate those spells that began in the exact 
month a worker reached an ALG I age threshold. For example, if  a worker born in January 1955 
became unemployed in January 2010, the data on entry into unemployment (which are reported 
by month rather than day) do not reveal whether he was 54 or 55 years old when he entered 
unemployment, which means I cannot determine his ALG I eligibility with certainty. Since this is 
a relatively rare occurrence, dropping these observations had a minimal impact on the dataset 
and preserves the accuracy of  the ALG I eligibility variable. 
	 After all of  these filters, I was left with 1,985 usable unemployment spells for my 
regressions. The actual number in each regression is lower, as survey data for some variables was 
incomplete, which meant that some unemployment spells could not be used in regressions 
featuring those variables. Furthermore, unemployment spells that ended in labor force exit were 
unsuitable candidates for all regressions that dealt with post-unemployment job outcomes, as 
were certain spells that risked introducing bias to these regressions . For each regression, the 24
number of  observations used is included above the results table, either in the paper or in the 
Appendix; each observation corresponds to one unemployment spell. 
3.2.2   Response Variables 
	 My first regressions deal with re-employment wage. Wage is a powerful indicator for job 
quality in that it is objective and (presumably) universally valued. The wage variable, like all 
employment outcome variables, is drawn from survey data on wage from the year following the 
end of  the unemployment spell (i.e., if  a person’s unemployment spell ends anytime in 2008, 
responses from the 2009 survey will be used). SOEP interviews are generally conducted at the 
 For more, see §3.2.4 and §3.2.5.24
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beginning of  a year, so the risk that the job described in the survey is different from the one found 
immediately after unemployment is small, although not zero, and should not bias results in any 
particular way. The wage variable used in my regressions is calculated as the natural logarithm of  
weekly wages expressed in euros, which results in a roughly normal distribution . 25
	 My next response variable is the new job’s prestige score according to Donald J. Treiman’s 
Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS). This scale was developed from 
occupational prestige studies carried out in 60 countries, averaging the national results to produce 
a single metric (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). Observed values range from 13 (garbage 
collectors and sweepers) to 78 (university professors and medical doctors). The SOEP survey 
includes detailed occupational information, and its PGEN (generated individual data) datasets 
include the SIOPS prestige score for each respondent’s occupation. 
	 Another independent variable is job satisfaction. This is collected as part of  the individual 
survey, where respondents are asked about their satisfaction with their employment on a scale 
from 1 to 10, with 10 being extremely satisfied. 
	 I wanted to examine the potential effect of  UI duration on hours worked in a post-
unemployment job. However, running a regression on a simple hours-worked variable was 
obviously not the best solution, given that working 80 hours per week is hardly better than 
working 2 hours per week. Unlike wage, prestige, or satisfaction, more isn’t always better, and the 
optimal level is very much a matter of  personal preference. Fortunately, along with an hours-
worked variable, the SOEP survey includes a question to see how many hours per week 
interviewees would choose to work if  they had their druthers. To generate a variable for the 
desirability of  hours worked, I squared the difference between desired weekly work hours and 
 Summary statistics for this and other variables are available in Table A.1 in the Appendix.25
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actual weekly work hours. A higher value for this variable denotes a position’s undesirability: it 
corresponds to a wider gulf  between how many hours a person works and how many hours they 
want to be working. 
	 The last re-employment variable is distance to work, which is part of  the SOEP 
individual survey and is expressed in kilometers. 
	 My final response variable, which also functions as an explanatory variable in many 
regressions, is unemployment spell duration. This variable is as simple as it sounds: from the 
ARTKALEN spell data, I take the difference between the month at the end and beginning of  the 
unemployment spell and add 1. In Germany, most new jobs begin on the first day of  the month, 
which means that unemployment spells end at the end of  a month (Caliendo, Tatsiramos, & 
Uhlendorff, 2009). Thus, adding 1 to the difference means that this variable should never 
underestimate spell duration and will not overestimate duration by more than one month. 
3.2.3   Explanatory Variables 
	 The first set of  explanatory variables is simply the set of  re-employment response 
variables (wage, prestige, satisfaction, work hours gap, and distance to work) from the survey 
preceding each unemployment spell. A previous job’s squared work hours gap is based on actual 
and desired work hours response from the pre-unemployment survey—I wanted to allow for 
heterogeneity in desired hours over time, since it is likely that hours desired is not a fixed 
preference, but rather that it is at least partially responsive to a respondent’s satisfaction with her 
current position. 
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	 There are three age variables: age, age squared, and a dummy indicating if  age is greater 
than or equal to 50 . Including age squared as well as age allows for the effect of  age on job 26
outcomes to be parabolic rather than constantly increasing or decreasing with age. In most of  my 
regressions, I find that the positive effects of  age are maximized around age 35, in the heart of  
one’s working career. Without age squared, the regression would be maximized either for 
teenagers or for the elderly, so the inclusion of  age squared proves to be very prudent. 
	 Next up are three demographic dummy variables to indicate gender, marital status, and 
nationality. The “Female” variable, naturally, is 1 if  the subject is female. The “Married” variable 
isn’t exactly as the name indicates. SOEP allows people to report their marital status as “married, 
living together” and “married, separated,” and I chose to mark only married couples who live 
together as 1 for this variable. My rationale is that the salient feature of  marriage for the purposes 
of  this study is the economic freedom of  having a spouse in the household, which may help to 
ease liquidity constraints during unemployment spells; I assume that separated married couples 
do not receive the same economic benefits from their marriages in this situation. In today’s 
Germany, there are likely to be many unmarried couples who live together and enjoy these 
benefits in the event of  unemployment; however, SOEP doesn’t provide for such a status in its 
responses, so only those who are married and living together are marked as 1 in this variable. 
Finally, the “Foreign” variable uses self-reported nationality from the SOEP data; anyone whose 
nationality is not German is marked as 1. 
	 A final demographic variable is years of  education, which is taken directly from the 
relevant SOEP dataset (using responses from the year of  the start of  unemployment). 
 The rationale for including this variable will be explained in §3.2.5.26
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	 Next are several variables relating to employment history. The first two are variables for 
the months of  qualifying employment (i.e., employment subject to mandatory social security 
contributions) over the two-year period preceding unemployment and and over the period from 
three to five years before unemployment. These variables, of  course, are the same variables used 
to calculate ALG I duration. These are devised not from the ARTKALEN spell dataset, which 
has too many gaps and censored observations to provide effective information on employment 
preceding unemployment spells. Rather, these are generated by examining people’s survey 
responses as to their employment status in each month to determine how many of  those months 
were spent in qualifying employment. This dataset is imperfect, so in some months no 
employment status might be observed; in this case, the entire period in question is treated as a 
missing value for that person. This difficulty in determining the exact number of  months of  
qualifying employment in the past two years is a big reason why my dataset fell from 5,638 to 
1,985 unemployment spells; however, it does mean that I have precise data on work history 
preceding those spells. 
	 Along with these variables examining months of  employment over the past 5 years, the 
SOEP dataset includes data on lifetime experience of  full-time employment, part-time 
employment, and unemployment, measured in years. The regressions use these values as they are 
reported in the year of  the start of  an unemployment spell. 
	 The last explanatory variable is the year at the beginning of  an unemployment spell. In 
my regressions, I treat year as a categorical variable with dummy coding, using 2006 as a 
reference year. In theory, this allows for a bit more flexibility with respect to fluctuating economic 
conditions, although these variables were rarely significant anyway. More importantly, this picks 
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up the huge variation of  unemployment spell duration in later years . Because I use only 27
uncensored (i.e., completed and well-documented) unemployment spells, and my data ends in 
2012, spells that began in 2012 naturally could not be as long as spells that begin in 2006. The 
year variables pick up the fact that results on spell duration for later years are skewed. 
3.2.4   Adjusting for Early Retirement 
	 One potential confounding factor in the data is the possibility of  biases arising due to 
differential exits from the labor force. Many workers who are unemployed end up exiting 
unemployment not by finding jobs, but by leaving the labor force: in 570 (28.7%) of  the 1,985 
unemployment spells in my dataset, the subject registered as “not employed” in the survey 
following his unemployment spell. If  these labor force exits were random with respect to ALG I 
duration, it wouldn’t be especially concerning; however, it is reasonable to guess that increased 
ALG I duration might increase the likelihood of  labor force exit, especially among older workers. 
This would skew results in a problematic way: if  a significantly larger portion of  a certain group 
leaves the labor force, then it is likely that those who remain in the labor force from that group 
will be those who have found particularly plum jobs, inducing them to become re-employed when 
they might otherwise have exited the labor force. In this case, that effect would taint any results 
obtained, as those with longer ALG I durations would be more likely to find a good job, not 
because the extended UI caused their job search to improve but because it made their group 
more likely to retire. However, to solve this problem by throwing out all older workers would not 
have been an acceptable solution, since they represent an extremely significant proportion of  the 
 This result appears in §4.2.27
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extended ALG I duration group. Thus, the problem was to identify exactly the group susceptible 
to this bias and to remove them from the sample. 
	 I decided on two simple tests to determine whether there is a serious problem of  labor 
force exit for a particular age group. First, what proportion of  the unemployment spells ends in 
labor force exit? Second, what is the relationship between ALG I duration and unemployment 
spell duration? In both cases, the answer is clear: this problem of  disproportionate labor force exit 
manifests itself  exclusively in workers who are aged 58 and older at the beginning of  their 
unemployment spell. 
Table 3: Probability of  Re-Employment by Age Group 
	 The rate of  job-finding for the sample as a whole is 71%. Although the ages below 58 
exhibit some variation around this mark, at no point does job-finding drop below 50%. For those 
58 and older, on the other hand, this figure is below 50% for every single age . Even a cursory 28
glance at these results is enough to raise an eyebrow, especially considering the ALG I duration 
extension (from 18 to 24 months) that comes at age 58. 
Age Group Probability
18-49 0.755
50-57 0.722
58+ 0.352
 For full results, see Table A.2 in the Appendix.28
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Table 4: ALG I Duration Regression Coefficient by Age Group 
	 These results come from regressing the probability of  re-employment on ALG I duration. 
In short, for those younger than 58, longer ALG I duration corresponds to a higher probability 
of  finding a job. For those 58 and older, this relationship is reversed: longer ALG I duration is 
correlated with a lower probability of  re-employment . 29
	 With these two results, then, it is apparent that disproportionate labor force exits are a 
problem for those aged 58 and up. This can be best explained as workers taking advantage of  an 
early retirement strategy. This was a problem in the pre-Hartz system, and although the German 
government tried to plug this hole by increasing the pressure on ALG I recipients to accept any 
job offered to them, it is hardly a surprise that the problem remains. In this case, it seems likely 
that unemployed workers beyond a certain age receive ALG I until exhausting their eligibility, 
perhaps halfheartedly undertaking a job search to meet requirements, then exit the labor force, 
waiting for social security to kick in at the official retirement age of  65. 
Age Group Coefficient SE
18-49 	 0.017         	 0.005         
50-57 	 0.008         	 0.008         
58+ 	 –0.015       	 0.007         
 Note: The lower coefficient for the 50-57 group compared to the 18-49 age group isn’t necessarily a sign 29
of  an early retirement problem: for this group, changes in ALG I duration are likely to come in the form 
of  increases beyond 12 months, whereas with the younger group, workers vary between 6 and 12 months 
of  UI. Because more people are still searching in the 6-12 month period than in the 12-18 month period, 
the variation experienced there is more likely to be advantageous, thus the coefficient on ALG I duration 
on this age group’s regression could be expected to be higher. Most importantly, in neither case should it 
be negative!
"30
	 With this potential danger in mind, all of  my regressions that deal with re-employment 
outcomes exclude those aged 58 and above, which should minimize or eliminate this confounding 
effect. 
3.2.5   Adjusting for Employment Subsidies 
	 One final potential concern is that my results would be affected by the 
Eingliederungszuschuss , a wage subsidy program designed to encourage firms to hire harder-to-30
employ workers, particularly older and disabled workers, with reimbursement up to half  of  the 
employee’s wage. This program is available to certain workers above age 50. Firm information on 
this program is difficult to obtain, and it appears that eligibility is at least somewhat determined 
by the discretion of  the local unemployment office. Furthermore, it seems to be fairly limited in 
scope and is not linked to ALG I duration, but rather to age, so its effect should be minimal. Just 
in case, my regressions include a dummy variable for age greater than or equal to 50 to attempt 
to account for a possible effect from this program. 
4   Results 
4.1   UI Duration and Characteristics of  Subsequent Employment 
	 These regressions examine the job characteristics of  those ALG I recipients who exit to 
employment; they find a generally positive effect of  extended ALG I duration on job outcomes. 
This effect is particularly pronounced on wage. An effect on prestige, satisfaction, and squared 
work hours gap is present for certain groups. There seems to be no effect on distance to work. 
 “integration subsidy”30
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4.1.1   Wage 
Table 5: Wage at New Job (Euros per Week, Log) 
n = 925, R2 = 0.310 
Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.038***       	 0.013        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.051**       	 0.022         
Age2 	 –0.001***     	 0.000         
Age ≥ 50 	 –0.089     	 0.101         
Female 	 –0.188***     	 0.043         
Married 	 –0.035     	 0.042         
Foreign 	 0.068       	 0.075         
Education (years) 	 0.041***       	 0.009         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, log) 	 0.326***       	 0.030         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 2 years (months) 	 –0.016**     	 0.008         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 3-5 years (months) 	 0.004**       	 0.002         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.006       	 0.005         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.000       	 0.007         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –0.006     	 0.010         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –0.007     	 0.062         
 2008 	 –0.063     	 0.066         
 2009 	 –0.066     	 0.063         
 2010 	 0.017       	 0.068         
 2011 	 –0.054     	 0.076         
 2012 	 0.051       	 0.089         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.016***     	 0.003         
Constant 	 3.657***       	 0.404         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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	 This result measures the effect of  ALG I duration on re-employment wage, combining all 
unemployment spells for those under 58 with exit to employment for which the other variables 
(employment history, previous wage, etc.) are available. These restrictions left me with 925 
observations, enough to show a highly significant relationship between UI duration and wage in 
the re-employed population as a whole. A one-month increase in ALG I eligibility corresponds to 
a 3 to 4 percent increase in re-employment wage. 
	 A note on this regression: I had considered removing wage outliers from the sample, 
reasoning that those with very high incomes are less subject to the whims of  the labor market. 
However, I found that results were not strikingly different with the outliers removed, particularly 
with respect to ALG I duration, so I kept the outliers in the interest of  maintaining as large a 
sample as possible. To compare these regressions side by side, see Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
Table 6: Effects of  ALG I Duration on Wage for Various Groups  31
	 Extended UI duration has heterogeneous effects on wage in different segments of  the 
population. In particular, it has a significant effect, increasing wage by over 4% for an additional 
Coefficient Std. Error
Male 	 0.024       	 0.017         
Female 	 0.046**       	 0.020         
Married & Living Together 	 0.013       	 0.017         
Other Marital Status 	 0.048**       	 0.022         
Aged 18-38 	 –0.014     	 0.053         
Aged 39-57 	 0.042***       	 0.016         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
 For full regression results, see Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 in the Appendix31
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month of  coverage, for women, people who aren’t married and living together, and people aged 
39 and older. One possibility is that these duration-dependent groups are less able to smooth 
consumption in the event of  long-term unemployment, and as a result they benefit more from 
increased UI durations in so far as they ward off  the possibility of  long-term unemployment. 
Another possible explanation is that the groups who don’t respond to UI extensions—men, 
married people, and younger workers—feel more societal pressure to be employed as quickly as 
possible, and are thus less likely to benefit from a duration extension. A third possible 
explanation, in the case of  married people, is that they prioritize different job characteristics 
(specifically, shorter hours) and use the boost in UI duration to pursue jobs that offer that trait 
rather than those that pay well.  32
 For more information, see §4.1.3.32
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4.1.2   Prestige 
Table 7: SIOPS Prestige Score at New Job 
n = 896, R2 = 0.508 
Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.354        
(p = .103)
	 0.217        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.423       	 0.358         
Age2 	 –0.006     	 0.005         
Age ≥ 50 	 –1.597     	 1.687         
Female 	 0.671       	 0.704         
Married 	 –0.322     	 0.702         
Foreign 	 –0.795     	 1.249         
Education (years) 	 1.400***       	 0.157         
Employment history
SIOPS prestige score at previous job 	 0.491***       	 0.029         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 2 years (months) 	 –0.156     	 0.124         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 3-5 years (months) 	 –0.113***     	 0.035         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.071       	 0.088         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.131       	 0.116         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –0.524***     	 0.173         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –0.339     	 1.052         
 2008 	 –0.619     	 1.127         
 2009 	 –0.458     	 1.072         
 2010 	 –1.995*     	 1.149         
 2011 	 0.128       	 1.270         
 2012 	 0.066       	 1.475         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.072     	 0.054         
Constant 	 0.178       	 6.344         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
"35
	 The regression of  SIOPS prestige score finds a relationship of  extended UI that falls just 
short of  statistical significance. There are, nevertheless, interesting lessons to be gleaned from this 
regression. For example, the wage gap between women and men, which was significant at the 1% 
level, does not have a corresponding prestige gap. A quick re-examination of  the wage gap 
reveals that it is driven by a significant difference in work hours rather than a difference in 
earning power per hour worked, a notion that is corroborated by the result that men and women 
find re-employment with similar levels of  prestige. 
Table 8: Effects of  ALG I Duration on Prestige by Gender  33
	 The effect of  ALG I duration on prestige only breaks the 10% significance threshold for 
one group, women, and even then it just scrapes past the 10% level (p = 0.085). This is a problem 
common to several of  my re-employment outcome regressions—I’m looking for small effects in 
rather noisy data with a fairly limited sample size, which often leaves my results tiptoeing on the 
edge of  significance. As for the reason that women’s re-employment prestige may reflect a 
stronger response to UI extensions, the explanation is likely the same as in the wage regression: 
women may be more liquidity-constrained, allowing for greater returns to additional duration, or 
men may feel more pressure to get a job long before UI extensions would enter the picture. 
Coefficient Std. Error
Male 	 0.041       	 0.344        
Female 	 0.499*       	 0.290        
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
 For full regression results, see Table A.7 in the Appendix33
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4.1.3   Job Satisfaction 
Table 9: Satisfaction at New Job (1-10 Scale) 
n = 883, R2 = 0.099 
Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.076        
(p = .109)
	 0.047        
Biographical variables
Age 	 –0.083     	 0.082         
Age2 	 0.001       	 0.001         
Age ≥ 50 	 –0.688*     	 0.385         
Female 	 0.076       	 0.160         
Married 	 0.362**       	 0.159         
Foreign 	 –0.358     	 0.290         
Education (years) 	 –0.048     	 0.032         
Employment history
Satisfaction at previous job (1-10 scale) 	 0.210***       	 0.029         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 2 years (months) 	 –0.053**     	 0.026         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 3-5 years (months) 	 0.009       	 0.008         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.025     	 0.020         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.023     	 0.026         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –0.067*     	 0.038         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 0.422*       	 0.254         
 2008 	 0.437       	 0.266         
 2009 	 0.474*       	 0.257         
 2010 	 0.613**       	 0.269         
 2011 	 0.153       	 0.297         
 2012 	 0.876**       	 0.349         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 0.010       	 0.012         
Constant 	 7.513***       	 1.454         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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	 Like the prestige regression before it, this regression comes tantalizingly close (p = 0.109) 
to significance at the 10% level. The demographic variables are interesting here: married people 
report significantly higher satisfaction with their new jobs, while those over 50 report very low 
satisfaction relative to their younger counterparts. Both of  these make sense on an intuitive level. 
Marriage could provide a psychological boost, or it could result in the flexibility to choose a job 
that leads to greater enjoyment without having to worry so much about one’s own income. Older 
workers, in some situations, may struggle more than their younger counterparts to adapt to a new 
environment or position. 
Table 10: Effects of  ALG I Duration on Job Satisfaction by Marital Status 
	 While marriage is correlated with higher satisfaction in the overall regression, unmarried 
people are the ones who respond significantly to UI extensions. This result echoes the ones before 
it: due to possible liquidity constraints or less social pressure to find a job immediately, unmarried 
people receive a boost from extended duration that their married counterparts do not.  
Coefficient Std. Error
Married & Living Together 	 0.009       	 0.063        
Other Marital Status 	 0.132*       	 0.079        
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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4.1.4   Hours Worked 
Table 11: Squared Work Hours Gap (Desired – Actual) at New Job 
n = 688, R2 = 0.044 
Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 –8.323      
(p = 0.207)
	 6.596        
Biographical variables
Age 	 4.207       	 10.978       
Age2 	 –0.102     	 0.147         
Age ≥ 50 	 68.400     	 50.822       
Female 	 –18.371   	 21.734       
Married 	 44.718**     	 21.153       
Foreign 	 45.076     	 37.096       
Education (years) 	 5.679       	 4.273         
Employment history
Squared work hours gap at previous job 	 0.118***       	 0.040         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 2 years (months) 	 –1.274     	 3.919         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 3-5 years (months) 	 –0.051     	 1.060         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 1.057       	 2.692         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 1.782       	 3.483         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –3.437     	 4.970         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 35.223     	 31.088       
 2008 	 9.585       	 33.104       
 2009 	 2.231       	 32.504       
 2010 	 –1.218     	 35.166       
 2011 	 –1.290     	 37.479       
 2012 	 –25.726   	 45.483       
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 1.882       	 1.713         
Constant 	 91.046     	 193.364     
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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	 Although the sign on ALG I eligibility is in line with what one would predict here, the 
p-value is further from significance than in the previous two regressions. This is a particularly 
unpredictable response variable, and only two of  the explanatory variables reach statistical 
significance: the squared work hours gap at a person’s previous job and, interestingly, 
marriage. Again, one can see the intuition behind this: people in a marriage may prefer to 
spend less time at work and more time at home, so they end up with a significantly larger 
gap between desired and actual work hours than those who live alone. 
Table 12: Effects of  ALG I Duration on Work Hours Gap by Marital Status 
	 This variable features a group benefiting from extended ALG I duration in a more clearly 
statistically significant manner (p = 0.036): married workers. This result is particularly 
noteworthy, because unlike the findings for women and prestige or unmarried people and job 
satisfaction, this shows a significant result for a group that didn’t experience a significant effect of  
ALG I duration on wage. The effect of  marriage on the squared work hours gap in the regression 
in Table 11 can help elucidate this result: married people display a strong preference for working 
fewer hours; this indicates that they do find UI extensions beneficial to their job search, but they 
take advantage of  these extensions by finding jobs that allow them to work fewer hours rather 
than finding higher-paying or more prestigious jobs. 
Coefficient Std. Error
Married & Living Together 	 –20.828**   	 9.911        
Other Marital Status 	 –0.389     	 9.130        
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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4.1.5   Distance to Work 
Table 13: Distance to Work at New Job (km) 
n = 753, R2 = 0.187 
Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 2.530        
(p = 0.344)
	 2.673        
Biographical variables
Age 	 2.536       	 4.474         
Age2 	 –0.060     	 0.060         
Age ≥ 50 	 17.272     	 21.537       
Female 	 –28.665***   	 8.660         
Married 	 32.292***     	 8.735         
Foreign 	 –13.551   	 15.635       
Education (years) 	 4.781***       	 1.723         
Employment history
Distance to work at previous job (km) 	 0.298***       	 0.037         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 2 years (months) 	 –1.190     	 1.484         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 3-5 years (months) 	 –0.908**     	 0.420         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 1.043       	 1.089         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 1.519       	 1.408         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 4.027**       	 2.047         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 37.679***     	 12.912       
 2008 	 16.973     	 13.649       
 2009 	 –1.525     	 12.923       
 2010 	 4.451       	 13.755       
 2011 	 –1.676     	 15.868       
 2012 	 0.456       	 18.300       
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.917     	 0.643         
Constant 	 –42.991   	 77.221       
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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	 For the distance variable, I found no significant effects from ALG I eligibility for any 
group. In the main regression, the sign of  the coefficient was actually different than what I would 
have expected (namely, that people who benefit from UI extensions find jobs closer to home). 
While there are interesting relationships here—women wind up with jobs 28 km closer to home 
than men, while married people find jobs 32 km further away than unmarried people—distance 
to work is likely not as indicative of  job quality as the other factors, or at the very least is 
unaffected by extensions in UI duration. 
4.2   UI Eligibility and Unemployment Spell Duration 
	 As Table 14 (on the following page) shows, the effect of  ALG I eligibility on 
unemployment spell duration without regard to exit outcome is positive. As expected, there is a 
significant decrease in the later years in the study, which cannot have spells longer than 12 or 24 
months (for 2012 and 2011, respectively). Nationality shows up as a significant factor for the first 
time, with non-Germans experiencing much longer unemployment durations than Germans. 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Table 14: Unemployment Spell Duration (Months) 
n = 1366, R2 = 0.163 
Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.332***       	 0.097        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.026       	 0.172         
Age2 	 0.003       	 0.002         
Age ≥ 50 	 0.418       	 0.908         
Female 	 0.422       	 0.439         
Married 	 –0.252     	 0.429         
Foreign 	 1.846**       	 0.787         
Education (years) 	 –0.304***     	 0.088         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, log) 	 –0.290     	 0.316         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 2 years (months) 	 –0.071     	 0.062         
Insurance-compulsory employment, last 3-5 years (months) 	 –0.027     	 0.022         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.156***     	 0.051         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.030     	 0.071         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 0.002       	 0.099         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 0.040       	 0.666         
 2008 	 –0.535     	 0.701         
 2009 	 0.065       	 0.668         
 2010 	 –0.716     	 0.710         
 2011 	 –2.699***     	 0.786         
 2012 	 –4.379***     	 0.906         
Constant 	 8.053**       	 3.588         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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Table 15: Unemployment Spell Duration (Months) by Outcome 
Employment: n = 997, R2 = 0.097 
Not In Labor Force: n = 369, R2 = 0.292 
Employment Not In Labor Force
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 –0.118     	 0.117        	 0.677***       	 0.186        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.277       	 0.200         	 0.464       	 0.347         
Age2 	 –0.001     	 0.003         	 –0.005     	 0.004         
Age ≥ 50 	 1.996**       	 0.986         	 3.048       	 2.059         
Female 	 0.683       	 0.461         	 –0.326     	 1.018         
Married 	 –0.265     	 0.451         	 –0.681     	 0.992         
Foreign 	 1.919**       	 0.808         	 1.503       	 1.923         
Education (years) 	 –0.267***     	 0.090         	 –0.188     	 0.225         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, 
log)
	 –0.349     	 0.321         	 –0.668     	 0.823         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
	 0.094       	 0.071         	 –0.174     	 0.124         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
	 –0.014***     	 0.023         	 –0.029     	 0.049         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.176     	 0.055         	 –0.056     	 0.115         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.084     	 0.075         	 0.067       	 0.163         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 0.047       	 0.107         	 –0.085     	 0.211         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 0.354       	 0.676         	 –1.239     	 1.676         
 2008 	 –0.439     	 0.716         	 –1.964     	 1.745         
 2009 	 0.257       	 0.688         	 –1.369     	 1.631         
 2010 	 –0.744     	 0.739         	 –2.006     	 1.703         
 2011 	 –1.669**     	 0.826         	 –5.400***     	 1.826         
 2012 	 –3.425***     	 0.954         	 –6.714***     	 2.086         
Constant 	 3.733       	 3.971         	 4.515       	 7.811         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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	 Our results, however, take a turn when unemployment outcome is taken into account. As 
one would expect, those whose unemployment spells end in labor force exit experience significant 
changes in unemployment duration in response to changes in UI eligibility, with a one-month 
increase in ALG I duration corresponding to a .677-month increase (about 3 weeks) in 
unemployment duration. As for those whose unemployment spells end in a new job, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between UI duration and unemployment duration. This 
contradicts the conventional wisdom on UI’s effect on spell duration: according to most analyses, 
UI reduces the marginal return to search and increases the reservation wage, which should cause 
job seekers to choose longer unemployment spells. Here, we find no evidence of  that effect. 
Despite this result, extended UI duration is correlated with positive job outcomes in the post-
Hartz system. To reconcile these two results, I propose a few theories on how ALG I duration 
might affect unemployment outcomes without causing a noticeable increase to unemployment 
duration. 
4.3   Possible Mechanisms 
4.3.1   Heterogenous Job Search Behaviors 
	 One possibility is that those who are eligible for longer unemployment insurance 
durations may conduct their job searches differently than those with short durations. For 
example, someone with 6 months of  UI, feeling a pressure to find a job as quickly as possible, 
may emphasize breadth over depth in her job search, feeling that it is more important to find 
something before UI exhaustion. She may be more likely to consider a job that doesn’t pay well or 
that demands long hours. She may also consider part-time employment, which would allow her 
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to get her feet under her while giving her free time to continue her job search in the future. On 
the other hand, someone with 12 months of  UI has a certain degree of  security, knowing that he 
doesn’t need to find a position right away. He might devote more time to a few high-quality job 
prospects—networking, researching the company, practicing for interviews—with the knowledge 
that if  his efforts fail, he will have time to find something else before his UI expires. Although the 
first job seeker lowers her sights and applies to less competitive openings, she may not dedicate 
herself  to the pursuit of  these in the way that the second job seeker does. As a result, their 
chances of  getting the jobs they apply for may be largely the same; however, the second worker 
applies for a better position because of  the safety of  longer UI eligibility. According to this theory, 
extended UI duration could lead to better re-employment outcomes without producing longer 
unemployment spells. 
4.3.2   Psychological Effects of  Liquidity Constraints 
	 Related to this first idea is the possibility that UI exhaustion and its concomitant liquidity 
constraint produce a significant amount of  stress on job seekers who face shorter UI eligibility. 
Thus, independent of  a decision to adopt different search tactics (as explained above), a person 
with shorter UI duration may struggle in the job market because of  the psychological burden of  
future expectations of  poverty. A person who is more relaxed about his future prospects due to a 
longer period before benefit exhaustion may be less likely to panic during interviews, more likely 
to impress the people she encounters at the company with a relaxed sense of  humor, less likely to 
suffer from mental health struggles that might impact her ability to apply for jobs at all. Thus, a 
job seeker with extended UI eligibility, in spite of  the theories about diminished marginal benefits 
of  search, may actually be more likely to get a job than someone with shorter benefits. If  this 
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effect is active, the job seeker with a long UI duration has better job prospects while reducing the 
search time needed to find a good job relative to others with less eligibility. 
4.3.3   Reservation Wage and Job Negotiation 
	 Another possibility is linked to the notion that UI eligibility increases the reservation wage 
of  job applicants, making them less likely to accept a job than someone with less UI eligibility. 
Perhaps, rather than rejecting jobs outright, applicants with higher reservation wages may enter 
negotiation for job characteristics with a more assertive attitude, leading them to request more 
desirable conditions for themselves: higher wages, better hours, or whatever else might be 
important to each individual job seeker. Applicants closer to UI exhaustion may be more likely to 
accept whatever terms are offered to them without negotiating for fear of  upsetting the employer 
and losing the job offer. In this scenario, workers with different UI durations could find 
employment in similar time frames with substantial differences in job quality. 
4.3.4   Unobserved Effect of  UI Eligibility on Unemployment Duration 
	 Finally, it is possible that there is an effect of  UI eligibility on unemployment duration 
that my regression simply didn’t observe. This dataset, which is tremendously useful for its survey 
responses, is also somewhat limited in size, which makes things like regression discontinuity 
analysis and unemployment hazard rate estimation difficult. Many papers—Caliendo, 
Tatsiramos, & Uhlendorff  (2009) springs to mind—use better models and datasets than mine and 
find that extended UI duration increases unemployment duration (albeit covering a different time 
period than my regression), and I would certainly not reject their results based on the outcome of  
my regression. However, others—Farber & Valletta (2013), for example—find that UI duration 
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does not affect unemployment duration for unemployment spells that end in employment. Based 
on this evidence, I have a little more confidence my results. So it’s possible, but not certain, that 
there is a relationship between UI eligibility and unemployment duration that my model did not 
manage to pick up. There is, however, also the possibility that the structural changes in the 
German labor market due to the Hartz reforms have produced an environment that is 
significantly different from its predecessor, one in which increased UI eligibility does not lead to 
longer unemployment spells.. Only time, and further study, will tell. 
4.4   Policy Implications 
	 The results of  this study indicate that the effects of  a change in unemployment insurance 
eligibility are not limited to changes in the unemployment rate. Re-employment job quality is 
positively related to UI duration; conversely, those who face reduced UI eligibility are likely to 
find less desirable jobs. Thus, the provision of  Hartz IV that reduced ALG I eligibility may have 
been welfare-reducing in ways that other studies, which focus on job-finding alone, do not 
observe. It is important to take this into account when evaluating the overall effect of  Hartz IV 
on the German labor market; even if  it did decrease unemployment, it may have done so at a 
considerable welfare cost by inducing people to choose jobs with less desirable characteristics. 
Determining whether these benefits outweigh the cost savings of  reducing UI payouts is a natural 
next step from these results; unfortunately, such an estimation is well beyond the scope of  this 
paper. 
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4.4.1   Preventing Free Riding: One Solution 
	 The answer to such a question may lie in solving the problem of  free riding in the UI 
system. If  those UI recipients who find jobs do not experience longer unemployment spells, then 
the additional cost of  extending UI duration is a problem of  free riding: people may receive UI 
benefits without a real intention of  finding a job, instead putting in just enough search effort to 
keep them qualified for UI benefits. When these benefits are exhausted, these individuals then 
drop out of  the labor force, often into retirement. 
	 If  the German government wanted to curb this moral hazard problem, one possible 
solution would be to offer a portion of  ALG I payments not as unrestricted benefits but as 
loans . Here’s how this might look in practice: everyone who registers for unemployment is 34
automatically eligible for payments on the level of  ALG II, just as the long-term unemployed 
who have exhausted their ALG I benefits receive today. For a certain period of  time—perhaps 
following today’s ALG I duration rules, perhaps different—an unemployed person has the option 
to receive additional benefits up to the level of  today’s ALG I level. If  he finds a job, then a 
portion of  his mandatory social security contribution is deducted as a loan payment until he has 
paid back the loan; in some sense, then, he pays for his own unemployment insurance. If, 
however, he exits the labor force without finding a job, he is responsible for the repayment of  the 
loan out of  his own pocket. Such a system would reduce the moral hazard of  UI: those with no 
intention of  finding a job will be less likely to accept the additional ALG I benefits if  they come 
with the expectation of  repayment. 
	 If  ALG I eligibility rules are not changed, then this plan is, at worst, cost-neutral: those 
who accept the loan and repay it with social security contribution deductions ultimately cost the 
 A similar proposal appears in Chetty (2008).34
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system exactly what it would have given out as pure subsidy, and if  anyone who would have been 
a free rider elects not to take the loans, then the system saves money it would have spent 
subsidizing the job search of  someone who was never really searching for a job. With this 
framework in place, Germany could then consider extending maximum ALG I duration, in the 
hopes that it will improve job search outcomes without increasing unemployment spells or 
subsidizing free riding. 
5   Conclusion 
	 This paper sought to examine the effect of  changes in the duration of  unemployment 
insurance on various measures of  post-unemployment job quality within the context of  
Germany’s unemployment system after the Hartz reforms. I find a significant effect of  UI 
duration on job wage, as well as significant effects for certain groups on occupational prestige, job 
satisfaction, and the desirability of  hours worked. I find no significant effect on distance from 
home to work. 
	 I also look for the effect of  UI eligibility on unemployment duration. I find a significant 
effect when all unemployed people are taken together; however, when breaking this down into 
those who exit unemployment by finding a job and those whose unemployment spell ends in exit 
from the labor force, I find that this entire effect is driven by the latter. In short, I find no evidence 
of  a link between UI eligibility and unemployment duration for those who found jobs at the end 
of  their unemployment spells. 
	 To make sense of  these results, I propose a few theories: different job search behaviors 
among those with different UI durations, a psychological burden imposed by impending UI 
exhaustion, a negotiation advantage caused by a higher reservation wage for those with longer 
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eligibility, or the possibility that my dataset simply failed to observe a positive relationship 
between UI duration and unemployment duration. Finally, I present one possible policy response 
to these findings: administering UI benefits above a subsistence level as loans, reducing the risk of  
free riding without harming those who genuinely seek to use UI as a consumption smoothing 
mechanism while searching for a new job. With policies like this, Germany could save money by 
cutting its subsidies to free riders, perhaps allowing it to reverse some of  the cuts that made Hartz 
IV unpopular in the first place while supporting, rather than damaging, the efficiency of  the 
unemployment insurance system.  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Appendix 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
Count Median Mean Std. Deviation
Response variables
Wage at new job (euros per week, log) 1386 	 7.313       	 7.234         	 0.705         
SIOPS prestige score at new job 1350 	 38      	 40.161       	 12.738       
Satisfaction at new job (1-10 scale) 1449 	 7        	 6.742         	 2.216         
Squared work hours gap (desired – 
actual) at new job
1340 	 25      	 107.692     	 226.347     
Distance to work at new job (km) 1184 	 12      	 36.074       	 105.668     
Unemployment spell duration (months) 1985 	 4        	 6.961         	 7.630         
Explanatory variables
Wage at previous job (euros per week, 
log)
1811 	 7.313       	 7.210         	 0.732         
SIOPS prestige score at previous job 1766 	 38      	 39.533       	 12.317       
Satisfaction at previous job (1-10 scale) 1816 	 6        	 5.910         	 2.566         
Squared work hours gap (desired – 
actual) at previous job
1288 	 25      	 121.773     	 236.100     
Distance to work at previous job (km) 1636 	 12      	 33.733       	 96.626       
Age 1985 	 39.417     	 39.411       	 12.732       
Age2 1985 	1553.674 	 1715.286   	 1032.144   
Age ≥ 50 1985 	 0        	 0.243         	 0.429         
Female 1985 	 0        	 0.443         	 0.497         
Married 1985 	 0        	 0.441         	 0.497         
Foreign 1985 	 0        	 0.059         	 0.236         
Education (years) 1885 	 11.5     	 11.988       	 2.316         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
1985 	 23      	 20.737       	 4.288         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
1577 	 31      	 26.508       	 11.073       
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 1984 	 10      	 13.422       	 12.056       
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 1984 	 0.1       	 2.230         	 4.508         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 1984 	 0.8       	 1.791         	 2.442         
Beginning of  unemployment spell 1985 	 2009  	 2008.665   	 1.784         
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Table A.2: Probability of  Re-Employment by Age 
Age Probability Age Probability Age Probability
18 	 0.500         34 	 0.731         50 	 0.762         
19 	 0.591         35 	 0.750         51 	 0.825         
20 	 0.786         36 	 0.744         52 	 0.833         
21 	 0.661         37 	 0.833         53 	 0.844         
22 	 0.644         38 	 0.757         54 	 0.512         
23 	 0.632         39 	 0.830         55 	 0.735         
24 	 0.698         40 	 0.771         56 	 0.686         
25 	 0.882         41 	 0.636         57 	 0.594         
26 	 0.816         42 	 0.755         58 	 0.479         
27 	 0.886         43 	 0.712         59 	 0.294         
28 	 0.816         44 	 0.722         60 	 0.370         
29 	 0.729         45 	 0.787         61 	 0.176         
30 	 0.687         46 	 0.811         62 	 0.333         
31 	 0.804         47 	 0.680         63 	 0.333         
32 	 0.915         48 	 0.886         64 	 0.267         
33 	 0.857         49 	 0.722         
"55
Table A.3: Wage at New Job (Euros per Week, Log) Including/Excluding Outliers 
Including: n = 925, R2 = 0.310 
Excluding: n = 880, R2 = 0.244, excluding 45 outliers (wage > €3,600/week) 
Including Outliers Excluding Outliers
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.038***       	 0.013        	 0.034**       	 0.013        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.051**       	 0.022         	 0.048**       	 0.022         
Age2 	 –0.001***     	 0.000         	 –0.001**     	 0.000         
Age ≥ 50 	 –0.089     	 0.101         	 –0.076     	 0.101         
Female 	 –0.188***     	 0.043         	 –0.144***     	 0.043         
Married 	 –0.035     	 0.042         	 –0.058     	 0.042         
Foreign 	 0.068       	 0.075         	 0.053       	 0.075         
Education (years) 	 0.041***       	 0.009         	 0.025***       	 0.009         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, 
log)
	 0.326***       	 0.030         	 0.281***       	 0.030         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
	 –0.016**     	 0.008         	 –0.017**     	 0.008         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
	 0.004**       	 0.002         	 0.005**       	 0.002         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.006       	 0.005         	 0.008       	 0.005         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.000       	 0.007         	 0.001       	 0.007         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –0.006     	 0.010         	 0.000       	 0.010         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –0.007     	 0.062         	 0.012       	 0.063         
 2008 	 –0.063     	 0.066         	 –0.022     	 0.067         
 2009 	 –0.066     	 0.063         	 –0.024     	 0.064         
 2010 	 0.017       	 0.068         	 0.014       	 0.069         
 2011 	 –0.054     	 0.076         	 –0.020     	 0.077         
 2012 	 0.051       	 0.089         	 0.095       	 0.090         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.016***     	 0.003         	 –0.014***     	 0.003         
Constant 	 3.657***       	 0.404         	 4.170***       	 0.407         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Wage at New Job (Euros per Week, Log) by Gender 
Male: n = 493, R2 = 0.359 
Female: n = 432, R2 = 0.244 
Male Female
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.024       	 0.017        	 0.046**       	 0.020        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.024       	 0.028         	 0.072**       	 0.034         
Age2 	 0.000       	 0.000         	 –0.001**     	 0.000         
Age ≥ 50 	 –0.029     	 0.127         	 –0.144     	 0.159         
Married 	 –0.024     	 0.050         	 –0.043     	 0.069         
Foreign 	 0.109       	 0.081         	 –0.015     	 0.145         
Education (years) 	 0.021       	 0.013         	 0.044***       	 0.012         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, 
log)
	 0.491***       	 0.042         	 0.217***       	 0.043         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
	 –0.006     	 0.010         	 –0.027**     	 0.012         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
	 0.002       	 0.003         	 0.006**       	 0.003         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 –0.004     	 0.008         	 0.006       	 0.007         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.008       	 0.014         	 0.001       	 0.009         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –0.011     	 0.013         	 0.005       	 0.017         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –0.134*     	 0.075         	 0.150       	 0.101         
 2008 	 –0.043     	 0.078         	 –0.086     	 0.110         
 2009 	 –0.137*     	 0.076         	 0.010       	 0.104         
 2010 	 –0.098     	 0.082         	 0.107       	 0.110         
 2011 	 –0.115     	 0.088         	 0.041       	 0.130         
 2012 	 0.035       	 0.101         	 0.051       	 0.152         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.010**     	 0.004         	 –0.020***     	 0.005         
Constant 	 3.062***       	 0.513         	 3.939***       	 0.628         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Wage at New Job (Euros per Week, Log) by Marital Status 
Married & living together: n = 446, R2 = 0.412 
Other marital status: n = 479, R2 = 0.272 
Married & Living Together Other Marital Status
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.013       	 0.017        	 0.048**       	 0.022        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.007       	 0.041         	 0.096***       	 0.031         
Age2 	 0.000       	 0.001         	 –0.001***     	 0.000         
Age ≥ 50 	 –0.134     	 0.119         	 –0.021     	 0.189         
Female 	 –0.222***     	 0.065         	 –0.151***     	 0.057         
Foreign 	 0.044       	 0.087         	 0.133       	 0.138         
Education (years) 	 0.031**       	 0.012         	 0.038***       	 0.012         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, 
log)
	 0.476***       	 0.043         	 0.223***       	 0.042         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
	 0.004       	 0.010         	 –0.028**     	 0.012         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
	 0.000       	 0.003         	 0.006**       	 0.003         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.002       	 0.007         	 0.007       	 0.008         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.003       	 0.009         	 –0.002     	 0.011         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 0.014       	 0.013         	 –0.024     	 0.017         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –0.101     	 0.092         	 0.049       	 0.084         
 2008 	 –0.005     	 0.092         	 –0.119     	 0.095         
 2009 	 –0.006     	 0.089         	 –0.118     	 0.090         
 2010 	 0.034       	 0.098         	 –0.008     	 0.095         
 2011 	 –0.063     	 0.109         	 –0.007     	 0.106         
 2012 	 –0.050     	 0.133         	 0.109       	 0.119         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.022***     	 0.004         	 –0.011**     	 0.004         
Constant 	 3.212***       	 0.820         	 3.765***       	 0.559         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Wage at New Job (Euros per Week, Log) by Age Group 
Aged 18-38: n = 455, R2 = 0.276 
Aged 39-57: n = 470, R2 = 0.384 
Aged 18-38 Aged 39-57
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 –0.014     	 0.053        	 0.042***       	 0.016        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.066       	 0.071         	 0.020       	 0.114         
Age2 	 –0.001     	 0.001         	 0.000       	 0.001         
Age ≥ 50 — — 	 –0.090     	 0.109         
Female 	 –0.141**     	 0.060         	 –0.245***     	 0.063         
Married 	 –0.098     	 0.068         	 0.015       	 0.055         
Foreign 	 0.075       	 0.105         	 0.123       	 0.111         
Education (years) 	 0.057***       	 0.014         	 0.028**       	 0.011         
Employment history
Wage at previous job (euros per week, 
log)
	 0.291***       	 0.049         	 0.349***       	 0.039         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
	 0.012       	 0.029         	 –0.018**     	 0.009         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
	 0.005*       	 0.003         	 0.004       	 0.004         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.023*       	 0.012         	 –0.001     	 0.006         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.022       	 0.016         	 –0.005     	 0.008         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 0.042*       	 0.021         	 –0.019     	 0.012         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –0.009     	 0.088         	 –0.002     	 0.087         
 2008 	 –0.159     	 0.098         	 0.026       	 0.090         
 2009 	 0.042       	 0.094         	 –0.143*     	 0.086         
 2010 	 0.070       	 0.099         	 –0.053     	 0.094         
 2011 	 –0.021     	 0.115         	 –0.091     	 0.102         
 2012 	 0.089       	 0.124         	 –0.044     	 0.130         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.019***     	 0.005         	 –0.014***     	 0.004         
Constant 	 3.498***       	 1.020         	 4.434*       	 2.611         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: SIOPS Prestige Score at New Job by Gender 
Male: n = 468, R2 = 0.478 
Female: n = 428, R2 = 0.541 
Male Female
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ALG I eligibility (months) 	 0.041       	 0.344        	 0.499*       	 0.290        
Biographical variables
Age 	 0.433       	 0.536         	 0.383       	 0.500         
Age2 	 –0.007     	 0.007         	 –0.005     	 0.007         
Age ≥ 50 	 2.008       	 2.502         	 –4.946     	 2.386         
Married 	 –0.334     	 0.976         	 –0.079     	 1.029         
Foreign 	 –0.643     	 1.550         	 –1.590     	 2.220         
Education (years) 	 1.298***       	 0.267         	 1.353***       	 0.207         
Employment history
SIOPS prestige score at previous job 	 0.486***       	 0.043         	 0.500***       	 0.040         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 2 years (months)
	 0.077       	 0.193         	 –0.326*     	 0.167         
Insurance-compulsory employment, 
last 3-5 years (months)
	 –0.073     	 0.057         	 –0.140***     	 0.045         
Full-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.053       	 0.161         	 0.057       	 0.112         
Part-time work, lifetime (years) 	 0.531**       	 0.270         	 0.083       	 0.138         
Unemployment, lifetime (years) 	 –0.492**     	 0.249         	 –0.509*     	 0.264         
Beginning of  unemployment (ref.: 2006)
 2007 	 –1.428     	 1.482         	 0.203       	 1.524         
 2008 	 –1.034     	 1.568         	 –1.111     	 1.671         
 2009 	 –1.826     	 1.499         	 0.325       	 1.585         
 2010 	 –1.788     	 1.633         	 –2.715     	 1.651         
 2011 	 0.498       	 1.708         	 –1.576     	 1.963         
 2012 	 –2.253     	 1.942         	 2.971       	 2.321         
Unemployment spell duration (months) 	 –0.037     	 0.087         	 –0.076     	 0.071         
Constant 	 –0.886     	 9.402         	 4.094       	 8.887         
Note: * if  p < 0.10, ** if  p < 0.05, *** if  p < 0.01.
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